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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Eric Livingston Weigle appeals from the judgment of the district court entered
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of robbery. On appeal Weigle argues the district
court erred by permitting the jury to examine an exhibit admitted for demonstrative
purposes.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Loretta Broussard was working as a teller at ICON Credit Union, when a man
handed her a note. (6/27/17 Tr., p. 117, L. 1 – p. 120, L. 4; Ex. 1.) The note read,
“Money on counter or I shoot u!” (Id.) The man was not wearing gloves. (6/27/17 Tr.,
p. 127, Ls. 17-19.) The robbery was recorded on two surveillance video cameras. (See
6/27/17 Tr., p. 159, L. 10 – p. 163, L. 6; Ex. 2.)
Ms. Broussard felt “kind of numb.” (6/27/17 Tr., p. 121, L. 18 – p. 123, L. 24.)
The bank had trained Ms. Broussard what to do in the event of a robbery. (Id.) These
procedures included getting a good description of the robber. (Id.) Ms. Broussard
focused on the robber’s face. (6/27/17 Tr., p. 124, L. 24 – p. 125, L. 11.)
Ms. Broussard reached into her drawer and pulled out money. (6/27/17 Tr., p.
121, L. 18 – p. 123, L. 24.) Ms. Broussard took her time so the video camera behind her
could get a good image of the robber. (6/27/17 Tr., p. 121, L. 18 – p. 123, L. 24, p. 125,
L. 12 – p. 126, L. 21; Exs. 3-4.) She pulled out stacks of hundreds, fifties, twenties, and
tens, one at a time. (Id.) Before she pulled out a stack of fives, the robber said “that’s
enough.” (Id.) Ms. Broussard handed him the money. (Id.) Then, as “per procedure,”
1

Ms. Broussard “scooped the note off onto the ground,” in the hope of retaining it for
fingerprints. (Id.) The robber turned around and walked out. (Id.)
After the robber left, Ms. Broussard followed procedure and informed everybody
that a robbery had just occurred. (6/27/17 Tr., p. 123, L. 25 – p. 124, L. 23.) Ms.
Broussard was put into a room to fill out forms. (Id.) She was not allowed to talk to
anybody until a detective came and talked to her. (Id.)
Officer Nickerson responded to the bank alarm. (6/27/17 Tr., p. 168, L. 12 – p.
169, L. 14.) When he arrived he secured the area. (Id.) Officer Orton and his canine
responded and searched the surrounding area and found inside a dumpster a pair of very
baggy pants that were inside out and a dark blue long-sleeved shirt with a gray shirt
inside. (6/27/17 Tr., p. 179, L. 3 – p. 186, L. 4; Exs. 5, 6.) The clothes appeared
consistent with the clothes worn by the robber in the surveillance video. (Id.) Officer
Orton believed the clothes were taken off in haste because they were inside out. (Id.)
Officer Chamberlain, a crime scene investigator, collected the robbery note from
the floor of the credit union and put it into an envelope. (6/27/17 Tr., p. 197, L. 1 – p.
198, L. 3; Ex. 1.) The envelope was booked into evidence. (Id.) Officer Chamberlain
also collected and packaged the clothes from the dumpster. (6/27/17 Tr., p. 198, L. 9 – p.
199, L. 17; Ex. 6.) The clothes were taken to the crime lab where they were dried and
photographed. (6/27/17 Tr., p. 199, L. 6 – p. 201, L. 2; Exs. 7-9.) The clothes found in
the dumpster included a multi-colored beanie. (6/27/17 Tr., p. 200, L. 22 – p. 201, L. 2;
Ex. 9.)
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Natasha Wheatley, a forensic scientist who specializes in latent fingerprints,
analyzed the latent fingerprint that was found on the note left by the robber. (6/27/17 Tr.,
p. 231, L. 19 – p. 238, L. 22; Exs. 10-13.) There were five prints on the note, but only
one print that was of value for comparison. (Id.) This print matched Weigle’s left thumb
print. (6/27/17 Tr., p. 239, L. 9 – p. 244, L. 6; Exs. 10, 12-13.) Her conclusion was peer
reviewed. (Id.)
The state charged Weigle with robbery with a persistent violator enhancement.
(R., pp. 93-94, 63-64.) The case proceeded to jury trial. (R., pp. 87-92, 95-97.)
Ms. Broussard, the teller, testified that she could recognize the robber if she saw
him again. (6/27/17 Tr., p. 127, L. 20 – p. 128, L. 5.) Ms. Broussard saw that person in
the courtroom. (Id.) Ms. Broussard identified Weigle as the robber. (See 6/27/17 Tr., p.
127, L. 20 – p. 128, L. 5, p. 130, Ls. 8-19.) Kimberly Lafong, the branch manager of the
ICON Credit Union, testified that the robber took approximately $1,100. (6/27/17 Tr., p.
158, L. 22 – p. 159, L. 6.) She also testified regarding the video surveillance recordings
of the robbery, which were admitted into evidence. (6/27/17 Tr., p. 159, L. 10 – p. 160,
L. 10; Ex. 2.)
Ms. Wheatley, the forensic scientist who specializes in latent fingerprints, testified
that it is possible to leave fingerprints on a piece of paper. (6/27/17 Tr., p. 225, L. 23 – p.
228, L. 7.) One of the methods to develop fingerprints from a piece of paper for testing
involves the use of a chemical called Ninhydrin that reacts with amino acids. (Id.) The
forensic scientist will dip or spray the Ninhydrin on a piece of paper and, after a couple of
days, the fingerprint will become visible. (Id.)
3

Ms. Wheatley explained the method by which forensic scientists compare
fingerprints.

(6/27/17 Tr., p. 228, L. 18 – p. 230, L. 5.) In order to be used for

comparison a fingerprint has to have value for comparison. (Id.) Value is determined by
the clarity and quantity of the detail of the print, and whether there is distortion in the
print. (Id.) There is an analytical method used to determine the value of a fingerprint.
(Id.) Once a fingerprint is determined to be of value, it is compared side by side with
another print. (6/27/17 Tr., p. 230, L. 6 – p. 231, L. 1.) The examiner looks at ridges in
sequences and trace the ridges to see if they match. (Id.) This process is generally
accepted within the scientific forensic community. (Id.)
As previously noted, Ms. Wheatly analyzed the latent fingerprint that was found
on the note left by the robber. (6/27/17 Tr., p. 231, L. 19 – p. 238, L. 22; Exs. 10-13.)
There were five prints on the note, but only one print that was of value for comparison.
(Id.) The print was labeled “1JC-L2-730.” (Id.) Ms. Wheatly compared 1JC-L2-730 to
Weigle’s fingerprints. (Id.) Ms. Wheatly compared 1JC-L2-730 to Weigle’s left thumb.
(Id.) Ms. Wheatley followed the analytical scientific method for comparing fingerprints
when she compared 1JC-L2-730 to Weigle’s left thumb. (Id.) Ms. Wheatly started the
comparison by going through the finger ridges in sequence. (6/27/17 Tr., p. 239, L. 9 – p.
244, L. 6; Exs. 10, 12-13.) She testified that, after going through the comparison process,
she concluded that 1JC-L2-730 matched Weigle’s left thumb. (Id.) Her conclusion was
peer reviewed. (Id.)
Ms. Wheatly prepared a PowerPoint presentation to demonstrate the process she
used to perform the fingerprint comparison analysis. (6/27/17 Tr., p. 237, L. 17 – p. 244,
4

L. 6; Ex. 13.)

The PowerPoint was admitted for demonstrative purposes without

objection and was published to the jury. (Id.) The PowerPoint presentation contained
pictures of 1JC-L2-730 and Weigle’s fingerprints (Exs. 10, 12). In the PowerPoint, the
relevant portions of 1JC-L2-730 (Ex. 10) and Weigle’s fingerprint (Ex. 12) were
highlighted to demonstrate the examination of fingerprint ridges performed by Ms.
Wheatley. (6/27/17 Tr., p. 237, L. 17 – p. 244, L. 6; Ex. 13.)
The district court instructed the jury that, if evidence was admitted for a limited
purpose, including demonstrative or illustrative purposes, it could only be considered for
that purpose. (6/28/17 Tr., p. 276, Ls. 11-17.)
During deliberations, the jury asked a question regarding Exhibit 1, the note.
(6/28/17 Tr., p. 321, L. 13 – p. 327, L. 13.) The jury wanted to see all sides of the
document, but only two sides were admitted. (R., p. 122.) The district court responded
that Exhibit 1 had to remain in the form in which it was admitted. (Id.) Both parties
agreed with the judge’s response to the jury. (6/28/17 Tr., p. 321, L. 13 – p. 327, L. 13.)
In a second question, the jury pointed out that they were missing a piece of
evidence. (R., p. 123.)
We are missing a piece of the State’s evidence: State’s Exhibit #13: The
CD Power Point presentation that Natasha Wheatley referred to for the
fingerprint analysis.
(R., p. 123.)
The district court indicated to the parties that it thought the jury already had
Exhibit 13 and suggested that it be provided to the jury with the limiting instruction.
(6/28/17 Tr., p. 327, L. 18 – p. 334, L. 17.) The court asked if there was any objection to
5

giving Exhibit 13 to the jury. (Id.) The state did not object, but Weigle objected to
providing Exhibit 13 to the jury. (Id.) The district court provided Exhibit 13 to the jury
with a limiting instruction. (Id.)
ANSWER: State’s Exhibit #13 will be submitted to you as requested.
Remember that it was admitted for a limited purpose and is the subject of
Instruction No. 14.
Thomas Neville
Senior District Judge
(R., p. 123.)
The jury found Weigle guilty. (R., p. 124.) Weigle admitted to the persistent
violator enhancement. (6/28/17 Tr., p. 342, L. 4 – p. 346, L. 2.) The district court
entered judgment and sentenced Weigle to twenty years with ten years fixed. (R., pp.
129-131.) Weigle timely appealed. (R., pp. 132-135.)

6

ISSUE
Weigle states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in permitting the jury to take into the jury room an
exhibit which was admitted at trial only for demonstrative purposes?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Weigle failed to show the district abused its discretion by permitting the jury
to examine evidence admitted for a limited purpose?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Did Not Err When It Permitted The Jury To Take An Exhibit
Admitted Into Evidence Into The Jury Room For Deliberations
A.

Introduction
Exhibit 13, a PowerPoint presentation consisting of highlights on Exhibits 10 and

12, was admitted into evidence for demonstrative purposes. (6/27/17 Tr., p. 237, L. 17 –
p. 244, L. 6; Ex. 13.) The district court instructed the jury that, if evidence was admitted
for a limited purpose, including demonstrative or illustrative purposes, it could only be
considered for that purpose. (6/28/17 Tr., p. 276, Ls. 11-17.) When the jury told the
judge they were missing Exhibit 13, the district court overruled Weigle’s objection and
provided Exhibit 13 to the jury, again with a limiting instruction. (R., p. 123.)
On appeal Weigle argues that Idaho Code § 19-2203 is ambiguous and
demonstrative exhibits are not admitted into evidence. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-11.)
Weigle did not make a statutory interpretation argument below and thus this argument is
not preserved for appeal.
Even if the argument is considered on appeal, the plain language of Idaho Code
§ 19-2203 provides that “the jury may take with them all exhibits and all papers (except
depositions) which have been received in evidence in the cause[.]” I.C. § 19-2203. The
plain language of Idaho Code § 19-2203 permits the jury to take with them into the jury
room “all exhibits...received in evidence” and does not exempt exhibits received in
evidence for a limited purpose. The district court did not err.

8

B.

Standard Of Review
The meaning and effect of a statute is a question of law over which the appellate

courts exercise free review. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001).

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Permitting The Jury To
Examine The PowerPoint Presentation That Was Admitted Into Evidence For
Limited Purposes
Weigle argues the district court erred in providing Exhibit 13 to the jury during its

deliberations because, according to Weigle, the language of Idaho Code § 19-2203,
regarding the furnishing of exhibits to the jury, is ambiguous. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.
8-11.) Weigle’s argument is not preserved for appeal. And even if it were, the language
of Idaho Code § 19-2203 is not ambiguous and instead clearly permits the jury to
examine all evidence admitted at trial. There is no language in Idaho Code § 19-2203
that restricts the jury from examining exhibits which were admitted for limited purposes.

1.

Weigle’s Statutory Interpretation Argument Is Not Properly Before This
Court Because This Argument Was Not Raised Before The District Court

On appeal, Weigle frames the issue as an issue of statutory interpretation because
Idaho Code § 19-2203 governs what may be given to a jury during their deliberations.
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-11.) Weigle concedes the issue was not framed as one of
statutory interpretation before the district court but now argues the court erred in allowing
the jury to take Exhibit 13 into the jury room because Idaho Code § 19-2203 is
ambiguous. (See Appellant’s brief, p. 8.) Weigle’s argument on appeal, that Idaho Code
§ 19-2203 is ambiguous, and does not allow for the jury to receive demonstrative exhibits

9

was not preserved. See State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275-276, 396 P.3d
700, 704-705 (2017).
In Garcia-Rodriguez, an Idaho State Police Trooper arrested Garcia-Rodriquez for
failure to purchase a driver’s license following a traffic stop. Id. at 273, 396 P.3d at 702.
During a search incident to arrest the Trooper found methamphetamine in GarciaRodriguez’s front pocket. See id. During the motion to suppress, the issue was framed as
whether the arrest complied with Idaho statutes governing arrest for failure to purchase a
driver’s license. See id. at 274-275, 396 P.3d at 703-704 (citing I.C. §§ 49-1407, 49301(1), (8)). The district court granted the motion to suppress. See id. The state
appealed, the Idaho Court of Appeals reversed, and the Idaho Supreme Court granted
review. Id. at 274, 396 P.3d at 703.
On appeal and on review, the state argued that because the Trooper had probable
cause to believe that Garcia-Rodriguez was driving without a license, in violation of
Idaho Code § 49-301(1), the “arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment, despite the
limitations that Idaho Code section 49-1407 imposes on arrests for certain misdemeanor
violations of Idaho’s motor vehicle laws.” Id. at 275, 396 P.3d at 704. The Idaho
Supreme Court noted that the state was “likely correct” under United States Supreme
Court precedent; however, the Idaho Supreme Court declined to apply the correct law
because the state did not argue that Idaho Code § 49-1407 was immaterial to the
constitutional issue before the district court.

Id.

“Because the constitutionality of

arresting Garcia-Rodriguez without regard for Idaho Code section 49-1407(1) was not
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argued before the district court, it is not properly before this Court on appeal.” Id. at 276,
396 P.3d at 705.
The same is true here. Before the district court, Weigle argued that Exhibit 13
should not be provided to the jury because it was a demonstrative exhibit. (6/28/17 Tr., p.
330, L. 22 – p. 331, L. 5.) Weigle argued that Exhibit 13 was admitted “for those
purposes to aid the witness” and argued “there’s a difference between an exhibit entered
to aid a witness and an exhibit entered as part of evidence for the jury to consider.”
(6/28/17 Tr., p. 330, L. 22 – p. 331, L. 5.) Weigle argued that “Instruction 14 really
differentiates those two types of evidence[.]” (Id.)
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The state moved to admit it for demonstrative
purposed. We didn’t have objection for it being admitted for those
purposes to aid the witness. I think there’s a difference between an exhibit
entered to aid a witness and an exhibit entered as part of evidence for the
jury to consider. Instruction 14 really differentiates those two types of
evidence, and I think it’s not an exhibit like Exhibit 1 that they had the
previous question on, it’s an exhibit –
(6/28/17 Tr., p. 330, L. 22 – p. 331, L. 5.) Weigle’s current argument, that Exhibit 13
was not an exhibit “received in evidence” within the meaning of Idaho Code § 19-2203,
is nowhere to be found.
While Weigle is likely correct, that Idaho Code § 19-2203 is the controlling
statute under which to analyze this issue, the interpretation of that statute is not properly
before this Court on appeal. Weigle did not cite Idaho Code § 19-2203 as the basis of his
objection before the district court and, thus, it is not properly before this Court on appeal.
Here, like in Garcia-Rodriguez, this Court should decline to consider the new legal theory
and affirm the district court.
11

2.

Even If This Court Considers The Merits Of Weigle’s Argument The Plain
Language Of I.C. § 19-2203 Permits The Jury To Examine All Admitted
Evidence During Deliberations With No Exemptions For Evidence
Admitted For A Limited Purpose

Contrary to Weigle’s argument on appeal, Idaho Code § 19-2203 is not
ambiguous. Idaho Code § 19-2203 provides that when a jury retires for deliberation they
“may take with them all exhibits and all papers (except depositions) which have been
received in evidence in the cause.” I.C. § 19-2203.
§ 19-2203. Papers which may be taken by jury.
Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them all exhibits and
all papers (except depositions) which have been received in evidence in
the cause, or copies of such public records or private documents given in
evidence as ought not, in the opinion of the court, to be taken from the
person having them in possession. They may also take with them the
written instructions given and notes of the testimony or other proceedings
on the trial, taken by themselves or any of them, but none taken by any
other person.
I.C. § 19-2203. “Since 1911, a jury in Idaho has by statute been allowed to take with it
into its deliberation room all exhibits properly received in evidence in a cause.” State v.
Fairchild, 121 Idaho 960, 969, 829 P.2d 550, 559 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing I.C. § 19–2203;
State v. Buster, 28 Idaho 110, 120, 152 P. 196, 200 (1915)).
Weigle argues that “the words ‘received in evidence’ as used in section 19-2203
are ambiguous, as they are subject to more than one reasonable construction.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) Weigle argues that this language is ambiguous because, he
claims, that demonstrative exhibits are not “received in evidence.” (Id.) The language of
Idaho Code § 19-2203 is plain and clear, and Weigle’s attempt to graft extraneous
ambiguity into the plain language fails.
12

It is axiomatic and long-established that a statute will be interpreted according to
its plain language and that where the language is plain the court will not resort to
principles of statutory construction. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719,
721 (2003); State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581 (1996). “When a
statute is unambiguous, it must be interpreted in accordance with its language, courts
must follow it as enacted, and a reviewing court may not apply rules of construction.”
State v. Wiedmeier, 121 Idaho 189, 191, 824 P.2d 120, 122 (1992) (citations omitted). In
Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 894-896, 265 P.3d
502, 507-509 (2011), the Idaho Supreme Court held that Idaho appellate courts do not
have the authority to modify unambiguous statutes even if they conclude that construing
the statute as written would produce “absurd results.” Here, the language of Idaho Code
§ 19-2203 is clear and unambiguous.
Idaho Code § 19-2203 permits the jury to “take with them all exhibits and all
papers (except depositions) which have been received in evidence in the cause[.]” I.C.
§ 19-2203. There is no language in Idaho Code§ 19-2203 that limits “all exhibits” or
“received in evidence.” No language modifies “received in evidence” to exclude exhibits
received in evidence for a limited purpose. If a judge has permitted a document or exhibit
to be admitted into evidence, even for a limited purpose, then Idaho Code § 19-2203
permits the jury to take the exhibit with them into deliberations. Here, Exhibit 13 was
received in evidence for a limited purpose. (6/27/17 Tr., p. 237, L. 17 – p. 244, L. 6; Ex.
13.) Thus, because it was received in evidence, under the plain language of § 19-2203,
the jury was permitted to take Exhibit 13 with them during deliberations.
13

The cases cited by Weigle do not support his argument. State v. Pangborn, 836
N.W.2d 790 (Neb. 2013), relied upon by Weigle (Appellant’s brief, p. 9), does not hold
that demonstrative exhibits are not received in evidence, or that they should be excluded
from jury deliberations.

Pangborn, 836 N.W.2d at 797-798.

The Nebraska court

determined that “demonstrative exhibits are not substantive evidence” but “[j]ust because
demonstrative exhibits are not substantive exhibits does not mean that they should be
excluded automatically from jury deliberations.” Id.
As mentioned earlier, the explicit purpose of a demonstrative exhibit is to
aid the jury in its consideration of the evidence and issues in a case.
Undoubtedly, in a complex case, demonstrative exhibits would be most
helpful when the jury considers the totality of the evidence during
deliberations. As the Seventh Circuit has stated, demonstrative exhibits
“often are useful tools that enable the jury to visualize and organize the
large volume of data produced by trial testimony.”
Id. (internal footnotes omitted). The Nebraska court conducted a survey of federal and
state court decisions regarding the use of demonstrative exhibits during jury deliberations
and came to the conclusion that it is within the discretion of the trial judge whether to
provide the jury with demonstrative exhibits during deliberation, though a limiting
instruction may be required in some cases. See id. at 797-806. That is precisely what
occurred here. This case supports the district court’s exercise of discretion.
Nor does Masters v. Dewey, 109 Idaho 576, 579, 709 P.2d 149, 152 (Ct. App.
1985), hold that demonstrative exhibits are not admitted into evidence.

Quite the

contrary. Masters involved civil litigation regarding injuries allegedly caused by a car
crash. See id. The defendants attempted to discredit the plaintiff’s story by introducing a
car seat similar to the one in plaintiff’s car for demonstrative purposes. See id. The
14

Court held that admission of the car seat for demonstrative purposes was not error. Id.
The defendant laid proper foundation and “[a]dmission or exclusion of relevant
demonstrative evidence is determined by the trial court through balancing the probative
value of the evidence against the dangers of unfair prejudice, distraction, confusion of
issues and waste of time.” Id. (citing I.R.E. 403). Thus, contrary to Weigle’s argument
on appeal, Masters stands for the proposition that a demonstrative exhibit can be admitted
into evidence if it complies with the Idaho Rules of Evidence and proper foundation is
laid.
Nor does the Federal Practice and Procedure Guide state that demonstrative
evidence cannot be not received in evidence for a limited purpose. (See Appellant’s
brief, p. 9 (citing K. Graham, Fed. Prac & Proc. Evid. § 5172 (2d. ed. 2015)).) This
article is primarily concerned with objects used during the trial which were not admitted
into evidence. See Id. The section goes on to recommend that demonstrative objects,
which were not introduced into evidence, not be sent to the jury room. See id. at § 5172.7
(see footnotes 31 and 32.) This Federal Practice and Procedure Guide does not state that
demonstrative exhibits cannot be admitted into evidence for a limited purpose, and does
not render Idaho Code § 19-2203 ambiguous.
Nor does Medrano v. State, 127 Idaho 639, 903 P.2d 1336 (Ct. App. 1995), make
Idaho Code § 19-2203 ambiguous or hold that exhibits admitted for a limited purpose
cannot be provided to the jury. In a post-conviction proceeding, Medrano alleged, in part,
that the district court violated his right to a fair trial because the court refused to permit
the jury to review a transcript of Medrano’s preliminary hearing during jury deliberations.
15

Id. at 642, 903 P.2d at 1339. The preliminary hearing transcript, while portions of it were
published, was never admitted as evidence at trial. Id. at 644, 903 P.2d at 1341. The
Idaho Court of Appeals held that the district court did not err because the preliminary
hearing transcript “had not been introduced as evidence for the jury’s consideration.” Id.
Since the transcript was not admitted into evidence, for any purpose, it did not go to the
jury room.
Likewise, State v. Foell, 37 Idaho 722, 217 P. 608 (1923), does not render Idaho
Code § 19-2203 ambiguous. The state charged Foell with possession of an intoxicating
liquor. Id. at ___, 217 P. at 607. During deliberations, “the jury took with them to the
jury room an exhibit which was testified to be moonshine whisky.” Id. at ___, 217 P. at
609.

The Idaho Supreme Court noted that the controlling statute had previously

permitted the jury to take only “papers and copies of public records received in evidence”
into the jury room, but had been amended and now permitted “all exhibits” in the jury
room. Id. The Court thus held it was not error to permit the jury to take the moonshine
whisky into the jury room, holding, “[w]hile we doubt the wisdom of taking to the jury
room an exhibit which is alleged to be an intoxicant, [the controlling statute], permits it to
be done.” Id. Further, the Court held that it was not error for the jury to conduct their
own tests to determine whether the exhibit was in fact moonshine whisky. Id.
Weigle also argues that the jury could have misused Exhibit 13 by performing
their own fingerprint analysis, which would be contrary to the purposes of a
demonstrative exhibit.

(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-11.)

This argument is not

supported by the record. There is no evidence in the record that any of the jurors were
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forensic scientists with the expertise necessary to analyze and compare fingerprints. (See
R., generally). Nor is there any evidence that the jury disregarded Jury Instruction No. 14,
which limited the use of Exhibit 13. (See id.) Further, Exhibit 13 consisted primarily of
other exhibits, namely Exhibit 10 (the fingerprint on the note) and Exhibit 12 (Weigle’s
left thumb print), which were taken back to the jury room without objection. The jury did
not need Exhibit 13 to be able to conduct their own comparison of the fingerprints, if they
felt so inclined and had the ability to do so.
Even if Weigle’s ambiguity argument is accepted, it does not follow that the
district court erred, because Weigle fails to argue that the legislature intended Idaho Code
§ 19-2203 to excluded demonstrative exhibits from jury deliberations. If a statute is
ambiguous the court will then apply the principles of statutory construction.

See

Schwartz, 139 Idaho at 362, 79 P.3d at 721; McCoy, 128 Idaho at 365, 913 P.2d at 581.
The principles of statutory construction requires that the court “ascertain the legislative
intent and give effect to that intent.” State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116,
121 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688
(1999)). “To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words of the
statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the
statute, and its legislative history.” Id. (citing Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688).
Weigle does not apply the principles of statutory construction in his argument. (See
Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-11.) Weigle does not attempt to ascertain the legislative intent.
(See id.) Nor does Weigle cite to any public policy or legislative history to support his
interpretation of Idaho Code § 19-2203. (See id.) Weigle only argues that Idaho Code
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§ 19-2203 is ambiguous and fails to take the next required step and demonstrate that
when the legislature enacted Idaho Code § 19-2203 it intended to exclude exhibits
admitted for a limited purpose from jury deliberation.
Regardless, Idaho Code § 19-2203 is not ambiguous. The plain language of § 192203 states, “[u]pon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them all exhibits and
all papers (except depositions) which have been received in evidence in the cause[.]”
There is no ambiguity. There is no exclusion for exhibits admitted for a limited purpose.
Exhibit 13 was admitted for a limited purpose. The jury was twice instructed regarding
its limited purpose. The district court properly provided Exhibit 13 to the jury for their
deliberations. The district court complied with the plain language of Idaho Code § 192203.

3.

Even If The District Court Erred In Permitting The Jury To Examine
Evidence Admitted For A Limited Purpose That Error Was Harmless

It was not error for the district court to provide Exhibit 13 to the jury. While
Weigle did not raise the statutory interpretation argument below, Weigle did object to
providing Exhibit 13 to the jury. (6/28/17 Tr., p. 330, L. 22 – 333, L. 19.) Therefore, if
Weigle establishes error, which requires more than showing Idaho Code § 19-2203 is
ambiguous, it is the state’s burden to demonstrate the alleged error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. “A defendant appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionallybased error shall have the duty to establish that such an error occurred, at which point the
State shall have the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a
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reasonable doubt.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (2010). Here
the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The jury had already seen Exhibit 13 in open court and Weigle’s only objection
was providing Exhibit 13 to the jury during deliberations.
THE COURT: You don’t think they should be shown it at all.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Correct, based on my previous comments.
THE COURT: They’ve seen it, obviously, in the courtroom. The question
is whether they asked to see it in the jury room during their deliberations.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Correct.
(6/28/17 Tr., p. 333, Ls. 16-23.) The jury had already seen Exhibit 13. Their question to
the judge did not indicate that they needed to see Exhibit 13 again to reach a verdict. (R.,
p. 123.) The question from the jury simply pointed out that they were missing an exhibit
that was admitted into evidence.
We are missing a piece of the State’s evidence: State’s Exhibit #13: The
CD Power Point presentation that Natasha Wheatley referred to for the
fingerprint analysis.
(R., p. 123.) The jury was present in the courtroom when Exhibit 13 was admitted into
evidence and published. The jury was given every other exhibit admitted into evidence,
but without explanation, they were not given Exhibit 13.

The jury’s question is

reasonable.
Further, there is no reasonable probability that allowing the jury access to Exhibit
13, a PowerPoint presentation, in the jury room affected the outcome of the trial. Exhibit
13 simply demonstrated the process by which Ms. Wheatley compared the two
fingerprints. Regardless whether the actual document was in the jury room, the jury still
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heard Ms. Wheatley’s testimony and saw the PowerPoint presentation in open court.
Exhibit 13 was also primarily made up of Exhibits 10 and 12. Those exhibits were
admitted and were in the jury room. The only difference in Exhibit 13 was it highlighted
the lines and ridges used by Ms. Wheatley in conducting her examination.
In addition to the fingerprint evidence, which the jury had regardless of whether
Exhibit 13 was in the jury room, there was overwhelming evidence that Weigle was the
robber. There was video camera footage and photographs of Weigle committing the
robbery. (See Exs. 2-4.) Ms. Broussard, the teller, identified Weigle in court as the
robber. (See 6/27/17 Tr., p. 128, L. 20 – p. 128, L. 5, p. 130, Ls. 8-19.) It was not error
to permit the jury to take Exhibit 13 into the jury room, especially with a limiting
instruction. Even if it was error, it was harmless error.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 1st day of June, 2018.

___/s/ Ted S. Tollefson_____
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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